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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE COUNTY COTTONWOOD 
SANITARY DISTRICT, a public 
entity, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
SANDY CITY, UTAH, a municipal 
corporation of the state of 
Utah, 
Defendant and Appellant 
LAWRENCE P. NEMELKA, Trustee, 
GORDON and VICKI HEINRICHS, 
Interveners• 
DISPOSITIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutory provisions dispositive of the issue in this 
appeal are: 
A. Utah Code Ann. S 10-9-8(3) (Supp. 1989), as amended by 
1989 Utah Laws, Chapt. 75, and reenacted in 1991 as Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9-407(2) (1992). 
B. Utah Code Ann. S 10-9-9(2) (Supp. 1989), as amended by 
1989 Utah Laws, Chapt. 75, and reenacted in 1991 as Utah Code 
Ann. S 10-9-704(2) (1992). 
These statutes are attached in the Addenda to this brief: 
Addendum "G" - 1989 Utah Laws, Chapt. 75 p. 188, 
amending sections 10-9-8(3) and 10-9-9(2) (R. 514). 
Addendum "IM - Utah Code Ann. SS 10-9-407(2) and 10-9-
704(2) (1992). 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Docket No. 930294-CA 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Since the filing of Appellant's brief, a supplemental record 
(Vol. 2) has been filed with this Court. The supplemental record 
contains, inter alia, the legislative history of Utah Code Ann. 
SS 10-9-8(3) and 10-9-9(2), recodified as SS 10-9-407(2) and 10-
9-704(2) (1992), including a transcript of the House debate. (R. 
511-528, see Addenda G, H, and I) The interpretation of these 
statutes is the gravamen of this appeal. Additional facts in the 
supplemental record which are relevant to this issue are 
discussed in the argument portion of this reply brief. 
The Appellee's brief argues other "facts" which are not 
relevant to the legal issues presented on appeal. These "facts," 
occurring subsequent to the judgment below, purport to support 
the same arguments which plaintiff previously made in its motion 
for summary dismissal. The denial of plaintiff's motion to 
dismiss the appeal is now the law of this case. State in re C.Y. 
v. Yates, 765 P.2d 251, 253-4 (Utah App. 1988) Plaintiff cannot 
"reserve its right to assert" the same argximents again on plenary 
consideration of the appeal. (Appellee's Brief, p. 3) 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT 
The Sandy City Council may properly review a determination 
of a planning commission in conditional use matters. A 
conditional use determination is a legislative-like decision. 
After Scherbel v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., the Utah legislature 
recognized the unique nature of conditional use decisions and 
amended Utah Code Ann. SS 10-9-8(3) and 10-9-9(2) (1991 Suppl.) 
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to allow a city council to designate itself as the appellate body 
in such matters. The trial court erred in refusing to 
acknowledge the plain language of these amendments or the 
declared legislative intent. 
The statutes, as amended, are harmonious with the 
legislature's intended separation of council and mayor functions 
under a council-mayor form of government, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1210 (1992). To the extent there may be any conflict, the later 
and more specific statutory amendments, Sections 10-9-8(3) and 
9(2), control over the earlier, more general powers statutes. 
Scherbel is a statutory interpretation case. When relevant 
statutes were thereafter amended to override the effect of that 
decision, Scherbel lost all precedential value. 
The trial court improperly relied upon Scherbel, instead of 
recognizing and following the statutory amendments after that 
decision. Moreover, the trial court's ruling was sua sponte. 
The Sandy City Council's statutory authority was never questioned 
by the parties. 
The trial court also erred when it reviewed only the 
decision of the planning commission and ignored the City 
Council's decision which was adequately supported by the record 
before the court. 
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POINT I, 
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTIONS 10-9-8(3) AND 10-9-9(2) 
GRANT AUTHORITY TO A CITY COUNCIL TO REVIEW 
CONDITIONAL USE ZONING MATTERS. 
Plaintiff Sanitary District refuses to acknowledge that the 
Utah legislature expressly intended to overrule the effect of 
Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 897 (Utah 1988) and to 
allow a city council to review administrative zoning action in 
the limited area of "conditional use" permits. (R. 511-21) 
Appellee's brief avoids the legislative intent and history behind 
Utah Code Ann. SS 10-9-8(3) and 10-9-9(2) (Supp. 1989), 
recodified as Sections 10-9-407(2) and 10-9-704(2) (1992), 
because that history and intent are diametrically opposed to the 
trial court's ruling and to plaintiff's argument. 
In simple terms, appellee argues that under the pre-1989 
amendment cases fMartindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 
1978); Scherbel; and Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 
704 (Utah App. 1988)], the Sandy City Council has no statutory 
authority to hear appeals in conditional use matters. In order 
to place the trial court's error in the proper perspective, we 
provide a more detailed explanation of a conditional use permit 
and the legislative history of House Bill 76, 1989 Utah Laws, 
Chapt. 75, p. 188. 
A. What is a "Conditional Use?" 
A "conditional use," or "special use," is a relatively 
recent concept which permits the inclusion in a municipal zoning 
pattern of certain uses which the local legislative body 
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determines, in a case-by-case basis, to be desirable in certain 
locations within the broad range of zones. As in this case, the 
very nature of the use or activity may generate excessive 
pollution, traffic and congestion. The use may detrimentally 
effect property values or increase the risk of accident or danger 
to public health and safety. Any one of these dangers militate 
against allowing the use at any or every location in the allowed 
district. 3 C. Rathkopf, Law of Planning and Zoning, § 41.03[1], 
[3] (4th Ed. 1975), 6 P. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls. 
1F 44.01[4] (1992); see also Utah Code Ann. S 10-9-103(1) (c) 
(1992). 
If not carefully controlled or conditioned as to location 
and use, the "conditional use" activity can be detrimental to 
surrounding neighborhoods and the larger community, negate the 
sound planning policies inherent in a comprehensive plan, or 
disturb neighborhood cohesiveness contemplated by that plan. 6 
P. Rohan, supra. at 1f 44.01 [4]; See BBY Investors v. City of 
Maplewood, 467 N.W.2d 631, 634 (Minn. App. 1991) (Affirming the 
city council's denial of a permit because the conditional use is 
inconsistent with the comprehensive plan). These are precisely 
the dangers which the Sandy City Council articulated when it 
rejected the location of plaintiff's sewer maintenance facility. 
(R. 242-44; 532-34; 585-87) 
The approval of a conditional use at a particular location, 
with certain conditions, is comparable to a legislative finding 
that the use is then harmonious with other permitted uses in that 
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area. 3 Rathkopf, supra, at § 41.05. A conditional use permit 
requires a "local legislative determination that the use, as 
such, is neither inconsistent with the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare, nor out of harmony with the town's 
general zoning plan." id. at § 41.08. For example, in Sandy 
City, the approval of a conditional use permit requires the 
determination that the use will be "compatible, suitable, 
desirable, and related to the permitted uses of the district" 
(Sandy Ord. 15-23-1, R. 314), and will not influence patterns of 
growth adverse to the comprehensive plan, detrimentally impact 
surrounding property or city development, or undermine the 
neighborhood health, safety and welfare (Sandy Ords. 15-23-3 and 
7, R. 315-6, 371). 
The conditional use decision is not strictly an 
administrative exercise, as plaintiff suggests. The granting of 
the permit is a "quasi-judicial" decision. State ex rel. 
Battershell v. City of Albuquerque, 108 N.M. 658, 777 P.2d 386, 
390-1 (1989). While the conditional use permit is considered a 
quasi-judicial determination in most jurisdictions, i.e.. BBY 
Investors, 467 N.W.2d at 634, that determination generally 
requires a legislative-like policy decision and not just an 
administrative application of zoning rules as in the case of a 
variance, a nonconforming use, or a building permit. 
Because conditional use decisions are often political in 
nature and "likely to generate great public interest," they are 
more appropriately passed upon by an elected legislative body 
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than an appointed one. 3 Rathkopf, supra, at § 41.15[1]. 
Conditional use action is considered legislative action in some 
jurisdictions when the local legislative body has reserved the 
power in its ordinances. 6 Rohan, supra. at H 44. 02[2], pp. 
30-1. Granting a conditional use under variable conditions can 
have essentially the same impact as a zoning change. Compare 
Sandy Ord. 15-23-1, 3 and 7 with Crestview-Holladay Homeowners 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Enah Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976); cf. 
Kristensen v. City of Eugene Planning Comm'n, 24 Or. App. 131, 
544 P.2d 591 (1976) (cited by plaintiff). It makes little sense 
to say that a council can rezone a parcel of land but cannot 
review a conditional use permit. 
The practice of a city council, under enabling legislation, 
to review the grant or denial of a conditional use permit is 
widespread nationally and no constitutional separation of powers 
problem is created. 6 Rohan, supra, at 1f 44.02; 3 Rathkopf, 
supra, at § 41.15. And, as plaintiff recognizes, not every 
action of a city council is necessarily "legislative" in nature. 
Lund v. City of Tumwater, 2 Wash. App. 750, 472 P.2d 550, 553-4 
(1970), rev, den., 78 Wash. 2d 995 (1977) (cited by plaintiff). 
Whether the conditional or special use determination is 
considered "administrative" or "quasi-judicial," the decision may 
properly be reserved to a city council in a council-mayor form of 
government when state legislation so allows. Morrison v. City of 
Seattle, 6 Wash. App. 181, 492 P.2d 1078, 1083-5 (1971). A city 
council is ultimately responsible to its citizens for the proper 
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function of the zoning law. Denial of administrative power in 
this "sensitive area" seriously impairs the council's ability to 
carry out that responsibility. Id. at 1084. 
B. Separation of Powers Under Martindale v. Anderson. 
Although conditional use permits have been a part of local 
zoning and planning ordinances in Utah since before 1976 (see 
e.g. Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Assoc, v. Enah Floral, Co,, 
545 P.2d at 1151), the unique nature of this planning device was 
not legislatively recognized until the 1989 amendments which are 
at issue here, Utah Code Ann. S§ 10-9-8(3) and 10-9-9(2) (Supp. 
1991) and the 1991 recodification of Title 10, Chapter 9 as "The 
Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act," Utah Code 
Ann. SS 10-9-101 to 10-9-1003 (1992) (eff. July 1, 1992). 
Plaintiff contends that these legislative changes were not 
intended to give a city council the authority to review 
conditional use matters. Considered review of the entire case 
and statutory background reveals the error in plaintiff's 
analysis. 
Prior to 1986, Utah cities exercised their zoning powers 
pursuant to state statutes substantially unchanged since before 
1943. The only "appellate" body allowed by statute for "zoning 
disputes" was a board of adjustment, mandated by Utah Code Ann. 
SS 10-9-8, -9, and -12 (1977) (repealed 1991). In 1986, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that under this statutory scheme, a city 
council could not review the issuance of a variance because the 
legislature intended that only the required board of adjustment 
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could act as the zoning appellate body. Chambers v. Smithfield 
City, 714 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1986). The court in Chambers holds 
that the board of adjustment is mandatory in zoning appeals 
without regard to the form of city government. 
Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978) rendered 
the Utah Supreme Court's first interpretation of the mayor-
council Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, first enacted 
in 1975. Utah Code Ann. §S 10-3-1201 to 10-3-1222 (1977). In 
Martindale. the Logan City mayor and the council disputed who 
could manage city property, approve city subdivision plats, and 
handle city finances. Id. at 1024. Zoning powers were not at 
issue. 
The court concluded that the mayor-council statutes intended 
a constitution-like separation of the legislative, policy-making 
powers (council) and the executive (mayor) functions of city 
government. Jd. at 1027. However, plaintiff takes this 
separation too far and constructs impenetrable, walled enclaves 
of government, without recognizing that the distribution of 
authority between the legislative and executive arms of city 
government is subject to our legislature's determinations. The 
trial court's decision here and plaintiff's interpretation of 
Martindale are too rigid. 
For example, Utah Code Arm. § 10-3-1210 (1992) defines the 
council's functions which include the "review" of city 
administration and "all other duties" required by law. A city 
council may create and abolish administrative departments (e.g., 
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land development), and define and change the functions and duties 
of those departments and their appointed officials. Utah Code 
Ann. S 10-3-1221 (1992). Furthermore, contrary to plaintiff's 
attempt to narrowly confine their statutory power to only 
"legislative" acts, city councils also exercise other 
administrative and quasi-judicial review functions, as 
particularly discussed in Appellant's brief at p. 10. See also 
Utah Code Ann. SS 10-3-1311(2) and 10-9-408(3) (1992). 
The doctrine of "separation of powers" focuses on the 
separation of the primary functions of each branch of government. 
Timpanogos Planning and Water Management Agency v. Central Utah 
Water Conservancy District, 690 P.2d 562, 567 (Utah 1984). The 
test does not require total, walled separation. 
Constitutionally, one branch of government may appropriately 
exercise powers of another branch (1) "when it is essential to 
the discharge of a primary function," (2) "when it is not an 
assumption of the whole power of another department," and (3) 
"when the exercise does not jeopardize individual liberty." Id. 
at 567, erupting C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction. 
S 3.06. 
The exercise of municipal zoning powers and the decisions as 
to the wisdom, necessity, and nature of a local zoning plan are 
legislative functions, solely within the discretion of a city's 
legislative body. Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 545 
P.2d at 1152; see also Marshall v. Salt Lake City Corp., 105 Utah 
111, 125, 141 P.2d 704 (1943). The exercise of zoning power is 
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primarily and strictly a local legislative function. And, under 
a separation of powers, the city council's review of such a 
critical function as conditional use serves an important check 
and balance on the administrative ruling of a planning 
commission, who is an executive body appointed by the mayor. 
The city council action here does not unconstitutionally 
impinge upon executive power. Martindale v. Anderson does not 
preclude a city council from reviewing conditional use matters 
when the state's enabling land use legislation so permits. 
C. Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp. 
After both Chambers and Martindale, the Utah Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its position that, under the legislature's grant of 
then existing zoning power, a city's board of adjustment was the 
proper body to hear "zoning appeals." Scherbel v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 758 P.2d 897 (Utah 1988). Scherbel holds that the Salt 
Lake City Council could not retain to itself the right to review 
the approval of a building permit in a historic district because 
the board of adjustment was the proper body under the council-
mayor government. This result was premised upon the complete 
lack of any statutory authority for a city council to exercise 
zoning review power. .Id. at 899. 
The Supreme Court explained that, under Martindale, the Utah 
legislature's separation of local legislative and executive 
powers under a mayor-council government did not allow a city 
council to usurp administrative zoning decisions under the 
statutory scheme. Id. At that time, Section 10-9-9 required the 
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appeals of "any decision of the administrative officer" to be 
taken to the board of adjustment. 
Within two weeks of the Scherbel decision, this court 
decided Davis County v. Clearfield City. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah App. 
1988), rejecting the Clearfield City council's denial of a 
conditional use permit for a residential "abuse treatment 
center." Relying on Chambers and Scherbel. this court concluded 
that a city council could act as an appeal board in conditional 
use matters only when a board of adjustment was not statutorily 
mandated. jDd. at 708. Because zoning review authority was 
statutorily vested in the board of adjustment, the Clearfield 
city council could not properly hear the County's conditional use 
appeal. 
D. The 1989 Legislature Amends Sections 10-9-8 and 10-9-9. 
As a direct result of the Scherbel decision, the 1989 Utah 
legislature enacted House Bill 76/ adding to and amending Utah 
Code Ann. SS 10-9-8 and 10-9-9 for the express purpose to 
override the effect of that case. (R. 512-21; 1989 Utah Laws, 
Chapt. 75/ p. 188 is Addendum "Gf" attached to this Reply Brief.) 
Both Sections 10-9-8 and 9 were clearly amended so that in 
conditional use matters a city council can designate another 
body, other than the board of adjustment/ as the appellate body. 
House Bill 76 added subsection 3 to Utah Code Ann. S 10-9-8 
(1989, as amended): 
(3) Appeals from decisions of the 
planning and zoning commission regarding 
conditional use permits shall be heard by the 
board of adjustment unless the legislative 
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body of the municipality by ordinance has 
designated another body as the appellate body 
for those matters. 
Utah Code Ann. S 10-9-9 (1989, as amended), was amended to 
add subsection (2): 
(2) Appeals from decisions of the 
planning and zoning commission regarding 
conditional use permits shall be heard by the 
board of adjustment unless the legislative 
body of the municipality by ordinance has 
designated another body as the appellate body 
for those matters. 
(See Add. "G") (Parenthetically, we note that Appellee's 
brief completely ignores the amendment to Section 10-9-8(3).) 
The expressed legislative purpose of these two amendments is 
to allow a city council the flexibility to adopt whatever process 
of "appellate review" works best in that city in conditional use 
matters. The legislature intended that a city council could 
designate any body other than an adjustment board to hear 
conditional use appeals, including reserving to itself, as the 
other body, that right of review. (Aff. of Rep. T. Lewis and 
House debate, R. 512, 516, attached as Add. "H") The declared 
legislative intent of House Bill 76 was "to overrule the result 
in Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 89 (Utah 1988)" and 
" . . . allow a city council . . . to specifically designate 
itself as the appellate body to hear and determine applications 
for conditional use permits." (Add. "H," R. 512, 516) 
The legislature also intended to protect the appeal 
procedures of cities with respect to what they were doing before 
Scherbel was decided. (R. 516, 520) And, although the zoning 
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appellate process was broadened to allow the procedure that best 
suited a city's needs, the amendments were narrowly confined to 
"conditional use" review. The new legislation did not change the 
appellate functions of boards of adjustment in other disputes 
more traditionally administrative in nature, such as variances, 
building permits, and nonconforming uses. 
In reliance upon the 1989 amendment and before the dispute 
arose here, the Sandy City Council passed Sandy City Ordinance 
15-23-7, requiring that all conditional use appeals be heard by 
the City Council and prescribing the scope of the Council's 
review. (See Applt's. brief, Add. "E".) 
Recognition of the unique features of "conditional use" 
matters was further underscored in 1991 when the Utah legislature 
repealed the entire zoning chapter in Title 10, and enacted a 
new, comprehensive "Municipal Land Use Development and Management 
Act." 1991 Utah Laws, Chapt. 235, pp. 873 to 888; Utah Code Ann. 
SS 10-9-101 to 1003 (1992). 
The new act defines a "conditional use," and describes its 
application in a municipal zoning plan. Utah Code Ann. SS 10-9-
103(1)(c) and 10-9-407 (1992). The 1989 amendments to Sections 
10-9-8 and 10-9-9 were reenacted verbatim as Utah Code Ann. 
SS 10-9-407(2) and 10-9-704(2) (1992). (Sections 10-9-407(2) and 
-704(2) are attached as Addendum "I".) Also, the new Act 
authorizes "special" zoning exceptions, the appeals of which may 
be heard by a board of adjustment only if so authorized by 
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ordinance. A city council may treat a conditional use permit as 
a form of "special exception." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-706 (1992). 
The trial court's ruling in this case reflects only a 
limited review of the statutory and case history of zoning 
appeals and the legislature's intent to break from that history. 
Scherbel v. Salt Lake City is a case of statutory interpretation. 
When the relevant statutes were amended in 1989, Scherbel lost 
all precedential value. 
The legislature's declared intent to overrule the effect of 
Scherbel v. Salt Lake City in conditional use matters is clear 
and unmistakable. (Add. "H") Legislative intent to allow a city 
to bypass its board of adjustment and designate another body, 
including the city council, is likewise undisputable. When read 
in context, the broad authority of the amended statutes is clear 
and plain. (Add. "G") The trial court erred in failing to give 
effect to that plain language and the expressed legislative 
intent. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT CONSTRUED SECTIONS 10-9-
8(3) AND 10-9-9(2) CONTRARY TO THEIR PLAIN 
MEANING AND THEIR EXPRESSED LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT. 
The plain and unambiguous meaning of Sections 10-9-8(3) ana 
10-9-9(2) allows a city council to designate another body, other 
than the board of adjustment, to review conditional use matters. 
"[A]nother body" means just that — and includes a city council -
- in order to allow a city, such as Sandy City, the flexibility 
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to designate itself as the appellate body as it determined best. 
(R. 512, K 4f 6; 527, Add. "H") 
The trial court's ruling and plaintiff's arguments fail when 
the proper rules of statutory interpretation are applied to 
Sections 10-9-8(3) and 10-9-9(2): 
1. The first and primary rule of statutory interpretation 
is to give effect to the declared intent of the legislature in 
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. Reeves v. 
Gentile, 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 
1314, 1317 (Utah 1983). If there is any doubt as to the meaning 
or application of a statute, the statute should be analyzed in 
its entirety, "in light of its objective" and to "harmonize its 
provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and 
purpose." Osuala v. Aetna Life and Casualty, Inc., 608 P.2d 242, 
243 (Utah 1980); accord Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 
480, 481-2 (Utah 1980). Effect should be given to every word so 
as to carry out the statute's purpose consistent with its 
language. Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 
P.2d 664, 671 (Utah 1991); Each word is presumed to have been 
advisedly used by the legislature. In re Adoption of T.R.F. v. 
Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 909 (Utah App. 1988) 
2. The amendments' language, as intended by the 
legislature and as applied by Sandy City ordinances, is 
harmonious with the nature and use of conditional uses and with 
council-mayor government. City council review of conditional 
uses does not encroach upon the separation of powers doctrine 
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because the zoning power is a primary function of the city 
council, not the executive. Moreover, the issue of separation of 
powers was discussed by the legislature, but was not considered 
to be affected by the amendments. (Add. "H", R. 512, 1F 7) 
An attempt to harmonize plaintiff's strained interpretation 
of the amendments contravenes their plain language and declared 
legislative intent. Plaintiff's argument destroys statutory 
harmony and casts uncertainty and confusion upon the zoning 
powers and duties granted to a local legislative body. 
3. Even if, as plaintiff claims, the plain statutory 
language of Sections 10-9-8(3) and 10-9-9(2) cannot be construed 
harmoniously with the Optional Forms of Government Act, then 
these conditional use review amendments, and their declared 
legislative intent, control because: 
a. Where two statutes treat the same subject matter 
but are in conflict, then the more specific provisions (e.g., 
review of conditional use matters) prevail over the more general 
provision (e.g., general council-mayor duties). Williams v. 
Public Service Commfn, 754 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988); Bagshaw v. 
Baashaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 1990); Flovd v. Western 
Surgical Assoc, Inc.. 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah App. 1989). 
b. The latest declaration of the legislature controls 
as the later expression of legislative intent. Murray City v. 
Hall, 663 P.2d at 1318; Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Board, 757 
P.2d 882, 885 (Utah App. 1988), aff'd. 783 P.2d 540 (Utah 1989). 
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Plaintiff argues that the proper interpretation of § 10-9-
9(2) precludes a city-council from designating itself to review 
conditional use matters. Plaintiff's interpretation is contrary 
to the plain meaning of the language, adds limiting expressions 
not found in the statute, and contravenes the declared intent of 
the legislature. Under the plain language of the amendments 
"another body," in context, means any other body and includes a 
city council, which is "another body." The claim that "another 
body" excludes a city council is not supported by language, 
logic, or statutory harmony. Plaintiff cannot twist unambiguous 
statutory language in a manner that contradicts its plain meaning 
and intent. Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corp., 828 P.2d 1071, 
1072 (Utah App. 1992). 
In order to impose its strained interpretation of Section 
10-9-9(2), plaintiff claims that the legislature did not really 
mean what it said. When the legislature says "another body," it 
does not mean something less. Cf.. Ward v. Richfield City, 716 
P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984). Plaintiff requires a court to add 
"except for the city council" to the broad but plain language of 
the amendments. An appellate court cannot alter the plain 
meaning of a statute by adding language aimed at correcting a 
supposed defect. Stevenson v. Monson, 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 70, 71 
(Ct. App. 1993) 
Under plaintiff's view, a city council would have no power 
to create a justice court in a council-mayor city. Utah Code 
Ann. S 10-3-923 (1992). If the council-mayor statutes control 
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over zoning statutes, then a city council could, under Section 
10-3-1221, abolish a planning commission regardless of its 
mandatory duties in Utah Code Ann. SS 10-9-302, 402 and 403 
(1992) . 
The statutory amendments should be read as a whole and given 
a reasonable, and not an absurd, construction. The amended 
statutes should be interpreted in light of the court decisions 
that prompted the amendments and liberally construed to effect 
the amendments' intended purpose. 1A N. Singer, Sutherland 
Statutory Construction, § 22.229, pp. 262-3 (Sands 4th ed., 
1985) . 
Utah's grant of zoning powers in Chapt. 9, Title 10 apply to 
all municipalities alike, regardless of type or form of 
government. Where the legislature determined there was any 
conflict with Chapter 3, provision was made therefore, e.g., 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-805 (1992). Plaintiff's attempt to 
restrict Section 10-9-8(3) and 9(2) creates absurd, artificial 
distinctions in Title 10, Chapt. 9 in cities with a council-mayor 
government. 
In order for plaintiff to read Section 10-9-8(3) and 10-9-
9(2) harmoniously with the Optional Forms of Government Act, 
plaintiff must ignore the plain language of the amendments and 
provide substitute language to its liking. The trial court erred 
by refusing to enforce the statutes as written and as intended. 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUA SPONTE REVERSING 
THE CITY COUNCIL ON AN ISSUE NOT RAISED BY 
THE PARTIES. 
A city council's statutory authority to review conditional 
use appeals was never questioned by the parties when the trial 
court filed its Memorandum Decision. (R. 364-9) The trial court 
improperly acted sua sponte to create and decide this issue that 
was never raised. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
847 P.2d 418, 420-1 (Utah App. 1993). 
Plaintiff's August 1991 Complaint and its Amended Complaint 
did not raise the issue. (R. 4-5, 70-1) Lack of statutory 
authority was not asserted by plaintiff in its request for a 
summary ruling. Plaintiff only challenged the City Council's 
decision on its merits. (R. 108-21) The court "exceeded its 
role as arbiter" and "infringed upon counsel's role of advocacy" 
by creating a controversial issue where none existed. Girard v. 
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1983). 
A court has no jurisdiction to grant relief beyond that 
sought in the plaintiff's complaint. To do so denies defendant 
due process. In Re Marriage of Leslie, 112 Wash. 2d 612, 772 
P.2d 1013 (1989). A court cannot grant relief on an issue never 
raised or litigated. Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 
680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984); Cornia v. Cornia, 546 P.2d 890, 
893 (Utah 1976) . 
Plaintiff sweeps aside this sensible, compelling rule by 
arguing that Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e)(4) (eff. Sept. 1, 1991) 
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allowed the court to determine whether the Sandy City Council had 
"regularly pursued its authority." Plaintiff's argument is 
faulty for several reasons: 
1. Rule 65B(e), by its terms, applies only to judicial 
actions of a court or administrative agency, and not to a 
municipality. 
2. Plaintiff never questioned or challenged the Sandy City 
Council's authority. The Council's authority under Sections 10-
9-8(3) and 10-9-9(2) to review the planning commission action, 
was never questioned by plaintiff in its pleadings or motion. 
Even under Rule 65B, plaintiff must raise the issue in order for 
the Court to consider it. A judgment must be responsive to the 
issues framed by the parties. Combe. 680 P.2d at 736. 
3. In order for Rule 65B(e)(4) to apply, the "challenged 
proceedings" must have been "judicial in nature." Plaintiff 
fails to reconcile its argument here under Rule 65B(e)(4) with 
its argument elsewhere that the Sandy Council acted 
"administratively." 
4. In Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d at 709-10 
this court applied a "review" standard different from what 
plaintiff now urges. See also Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 
685 P.2d 1032, 1034-5 (Utah 1984). Also, the limited review that 
plaintiff claims exists under Rule 65B(e)(4) is inconsistent with 
the judicial review of zoning decisions established by Utah Code 
Ann. S 10-9-1001 (1992). 
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5. As demonstrated herein, the Sandy City Council has the 
statutory authority to review "conditional use" matters in Sandy 
City. Iff as plaintiff claims, the district court was required 
to examine that authority and under Rule 65B(e)(4) that review 
"shall not extend further . . . .," Plaintiff is not then 
entitled to any "review" on the issues raised in its amended 
complaint and Sandy City is entitled to reinstatement of its 
determination denying the conditional use permit. 
Plaintiff also attempts to excuse the court's reversible 
error by claiming that the lower court only "reviewed" the Sandy 
City Council's decision. Plaintiff manufactures, without 
support, an artificial distinction between "trying" an issue and 
"reviewing" the City Council's determination. Whether a "trial" 
or a "review," the district court's decision was an adjudication 
of plaintiff's claims, and a court may not "adjudicate" matters 
not placed before it by the parties. Chevron U.S.A., 847 P.2d at 
420. 
Even an appellate court, when it "reviews" a lower court or 
administrative agency, will not consider and rule sua sponte upon 
an issue that was not properly presented and preserved for 
"review" by a party. State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228, 1229 
(Utah App. 1992); cf. PicJchover v. Smith's Management Corp., 771 
P.2d 664, 670 (Utah App. 1989) (issue raised at oral argument is 
beyond the scope of the issue formed in the appeal). The 
interests of justice are not enhanced when the district court 
exceeds its authority and purpose by deciding the case on an 
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issue never presented for determination. Girard, 660 P.2d at 
247; Combe, 680 P.2d at 736. 
The prejudicial error of the district court's approach is 
even more apparent because Sandy City had no opportunity to argue 
the proper interpretation of Sections 10-9-8(3) and 10-9-9(2), as 
they were amended, or to educate the trial court as to the 
legislature's expressed intent with regard thereto. 
The district court's sua sponte ruling that Sandy City 
lacked statutory authority to review conditional use matters 
should be reversed because the issue was not ever raised and 
presented for determination, and because that court failed to 
follow the plain meaning and legislative intent of the 1989 
statutory language. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE PROPER 
STANDARD OF REVIEW TO THE SANDY CITY 
COUNCIL'S DECISION. 
Plaintiff's brief does not dispute or rebut in any way 
Point IV of the Appellant Brief. The district court's, 
Memorandum Decision claimed that there was a "substantial basis" 
to uphold the ruling of the planning commission. (R. 368) 
However, the court did not comply with any acceptable standard of 
review in focusing on the planning commission and treating 
askance the substantial, reasonable decision-making process of 
the Sandy City Council in denying the conditional use permit. 
The district court was obliged to review the Sandy City 
Council's decision denying the use permit under Xanthos v. Board 
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of Adjustment of Salt Lake City. 685 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1984). 
Upon judicial review, the issue was whether the council's action 
was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious. Id. This 
court applied that same standard in Davis County v. Clearfield 
City, 756 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah App. 1988). See also Utah Code 
Ann. S 10-9-1001(3) (1992) (eff. July 1, 1992). 
As the municipal reviewing body, the Sandy City Council 
should have been accorded wide discretion and its specialized 
knowledge and primary zoning functions recognized in conditional 
use matters. Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1034. By looking only at the 
decision of the planning commission, the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to defer to the Council's exercise of 
discretion. Cf.. Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 
23, 27 (Utah App. 1991). See also 4 Anderson, American Law of 
Zoning 3d, S 27.30, pp. 568-71 (3d Ed. 1986). 
Based upon the parties' evidence and presentations to the 
Sandy City Council, the Council determined that plaintiff's 
maintenance-administration facility did not contribute to the 
general well being of the neighborhood. The proposed use 
generates air, ground and noise pollution injurious to the health 
and safety of the residents. The quiet, spacious residential 
neighborhood intended by the city's comprehensive plan and 
ordinances are irreparably destroyed. (R. 243-5; Findings in 
Applt's brief, Add. C; R. 231-3, 216, 315) The sanitary district 
facility is not compatible with, suitable to, or desirable at 
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this particular location. As a "maintenance facility," the use 
is not a "permitted" use under city ordinance. (R. 314-16, 323) 
The trial court failed to properly review the record 
supporting the reasons for the City Council's action. The 
decision of the Sandy City Council to deny the conditional use 
permit should be upheld and the trial court reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred when it decided that the Sandy City 
Council had no statutory authority to review conditional use 
matters in Sandy City. The Sandy City ordinance 15-23-7 is 
proper under former Sections 10-9-8(3) and 10-9-9(2), and City 
Council review is permitted by statute. The plain language of 
these 1989 amendments and their declared legislative intent 
authorize the City Council's review. The court also erred in 
deciding this issue sua sponte and refusing to apply the proper 
standard of review of the Council's decision. That decision is 
fully supported by the record of the Council. 
The district court's judgment should be reversed and the 
case remanded to enter judgment for Sandy City on the Sanitary 
District's Amended Complaint. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of September, 1993. 
(IXeuIfStitj^—^ 
V ./ L J 
Clark R. Nielsen 
Stephen L. Henriod 
HENRIOD, HENRIOD & NIELSEN 
185 South State Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1538 
Telephone: (801) 321-7800 
Attorneys for Appellant Sandy City 
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ADDENDUM G 
1989 Utah Laws, Chapt. 75, p. 188, amending sections 
10-9-8(3) and 10-9-9(2) (R. 514). 
Ch.75 Laws of U t a h - 1 9 8 9 
CHAPTER 75 
H. B. No. 76 
Passed February 21, 1989 
Approved March 10, 1989 
Effective April 24, 1989 
APPEALS TO BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
By Ted D. Lewis 
AN ACT RELATING TO ZONING, BUILDING, 
AND PLANNING; DISALLOWING AP-
PEALS FROM DECISIONS RENDERED BY 
A MUNICIPALITY'S PLANNING AND ZON-
ING COMMISSION TO THE BOARD OF AD-
JUSTMENT UNLESS THE LEGISLATIVE 
BODY OF THE MUNICIPALITY HAS DESIG-
NATED THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT AS 
THE APPELLATE BODY. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
10-9-3, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 30, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
10-9-9, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 10-9-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 30, Laws of Utah 1983, ia 
amended to read: 
10-9-8. Organizat ion of board — Meetings — 
Duties of members — Zoning adminis t ra-
tor — Appointment — Funct ions — Ap-
peals to the board — Appeals from Plan-
ning and Zoning Commission* 
(1) The board of adjustment shall organize and 
elect a chairman and adopt rules in accordance with 
the provisions of any ordinance adopted pursuant to 
this article. Meetings of the board shall be held at 
the call of the chairman and at such other times as 
the board may determine. The chairman, or in [hie] 
the absence of the chairman the acting chairman, 
may administer oaths and compel the attendance of 
witnesses. All meetings of the board shall be open to 
the public. The board shall keep minutes of its pro-
ceedings, showing the vote of each member upon 
each question, or if absent or failing to vote indicat-
ing [s«ehl that fact, and shall keep records of its ex-
aminations and other official actions^ all of which}. 
The records shall be immediately filed in the office of 
the board and [shall be] are a public record 
(2) The governing body may provide for the ap-
pointment of a zoning administrator to decide rou-
tine and uncontested matters of the board of adjust-
ment, as designated by the board, and pursuant to 
its established guidelines. Any person aggrieved by 
a decision of the zoning administrator may appeal 
the decision to the board of adjustment, as provided 
in this chapter. 
(3) Appeals from decisions of the planning and 
zoning commission regarding conditional use per-
mits shall be heard by the board of adjustment un-
less the legislative body of the municipality by ordl-
nancc has designated another body as the appellate 
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body for those matters. 
Sect ion 2. Section Amended. 
Section 10-9-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is 
amended to read: 
10-9-9. Appeals to boa rd — l i m e — Persons 
en t i t led — Transmission of p a p e r s — Ap-
peals from P lann ing a n d Zoning Commis-
sion. 
(1) Appeals to the board of adjustment may be tak-
en by any person aggrieved or by any officer, depart-
ment, board, or bureau of the municipality affected 
by any decision of the administrative officer. [Sueh] 
The appeal shall be taken within a reasonable time, 
as provided by the rules of the board, by filing with* 
the officer from whom the appeal is taken and with 
the board of adjustment a notice of appeal specifying 
the grounds [thereef] for the appeal. The officer 
from whom the appeal is taken shall [forthwith] im-
mediately transmit to the board of adjustment all 
the papers constituting the record upon which the 
action appealed from was taken. 
(2) Appeals from decisions of the planning and 
zoning commission regarding conditional use per-
mits shall be heard by the board of adjustment un-
less the legislative body of the municipality by ordi-
nance has designated another body as the appellate 
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 LAWS OF UTAH 
Be it enacted by the Legist 
Section 1. Section Axnei 
Section 78-34-2, Utah C 
last amended by Chapter* 
amended to read: 
78-34-2, Es ta tes and rii 
en. 
The following [is-a-des 
andrights in lands aresub 
public use: 
(1) [A] a fee simple, wh< 
^publ icbui ld ings or* 
(b) permanent building 
(c) reservoirs and dam* 
o n i o n e d [thereby*-**-* 
(c) an outlet for a flow, [ 
de"Bris or tailings of a m 
place for the reduction c 
(f) solar evaporation^ 
therecovery of minerals 
laid with minerals, coal, 
ly valuable to justify e. 
easement may be take 
o v e r [ s ^ ) £ £ d e P ° s U J 
(2) [Aft] an easemen 
useH; and 
(3 ) f l3*e ]^£ r i S h t o f 
of lands, with the ng 
from those lands eart 




Affidavit of former Representative Ted D. Lewis and 
transcript of House Debate, (R. 511-13, 515-521). 
Clark R. Nielsen (2406) 
Stephen L. Henriod (1469) 
Sara Bendel Ryan (6133) 
HENRIOD, HENRIOD & NIELSEN 
Attorneys for Sandy City Corporation 
185 South State Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1538 
Telephone: (801) 321-7800 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY COTTONWOOD 




SANDY CITY, UTAH a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF FORMER 
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVE 
TED D. LEWIS 
Civil No. 910905227CV 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Ted D. Lewis, being first duly sworn, affirms and represents 
that: 
1. I was an elected member of the Utah House of 
Representatives from 1983 to 1992. 
2. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State 
Add. "H" 
of Utah and have been engaged in the practice of law since 1976. 
3. In the 1989 Utah Legislative Session, I sponsored House 
Bill 76 (1989 Utah Laws 188, eff. April 24, 1989, attached) which 
amended to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-8 and § 10-9-9 (1953) regarding 
the designation by municipalities of the appellate body to hear 
appeals in "conditional use" applications. 
4. House Bill 76 was intended to overrule the result in 
Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 758 P.2d 89, (Utah 1988) 
and to allow a municipality such as Sandy City the flexibility to 
designate by ordinance what it considered the appropriate 
appellate body to review the decision of the Planning and Zoning 
Commission in conditional use matters. 
5. It was the intent of House Bill 76 that only a Planning 
and Zoning Commission could not be designated as the appellate 
body for its own decisions on conditional use permits but that 
any other body could be designated. 
6. House Bill 76 was specifically intended to allow a city 
council, or other legislative body, to specifically designate 
itself as the appellate body to hear and determine applications 
for conditional use permits. 
7. An issue of the separation of administrative and 
legislative powers was raised and considered in the legislative 
debate of House Bill 76 but was not considered to be affected by 
this legislation. 
8. I have read the transcript of the House of 
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Representatives Debate for House Bill 76, dated January 18, 1989, 
and attached hereto and I believe and affirm that the transcript 
is a true and accurate record of the debate and discussion on the 
floor of the House on that date regarding this matter. 
Respectfully submitted this /*/-& day of July, 1993. 
<^£AZ ^ ^ 
Ted D. Lewis 
FORMER REPRESENTATIVE, 
UTAH HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84136 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this \*\ day of July, 1993 
sis 
IIOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
STATE OF UTAH 
318 STATE CAPtTOL • SALT LAKE CITY 841 14 
1989 GENERAL SESSION 
47TH LEGISLATURE, STATE OF UTAH 
HB 76, APPEALS TO BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
By TED D. LEWIS 
I hereby certify that the attached transcript, with corrections noted in pencil, is 
a verbatim record of the discussion regarding HB 76, APPEALS TO BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, 
By Ted D. Lewis, which occurred in the House Chamber on January 18, 1989, and is recorded 
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Date certified 
Memo. Exhibit B 
House Bill 76 
JANUARY 18, 1989 
DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
Representative Lewis: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I move at this time 
that we remove the circle from the House Bill 76. 
Speaker: The motion is that we uncircle House Bill Number 76. Is 
there discussion of the motion. All in favor of the motion say 
"I". Opposed "No". Motion carries; the bill is uncircled. Go 
ahead Representative. 
Lewis: Thank You Mr. Speaker. Fellow Legislatures, in reference 
to a request of several parties who had questions about this bill 
in its effect. We circled it earlier, and have met with various 
people. Representative Moody has met with some councilmen from the 
city of Sandy, we have had legal council review it and make sure 
that indeed the concerns were understood and addressed if 
appropriate to the bill. You need to be aware that there is an 
amendment, a committee amendment, on the pink sheet behind the bill 
which changes the language and actually 
brief in explaining what this bill does, 
The Supreme Court heard a case lastffifcear 
that all appeals from the Planning and Zoning Commission would have 
to go to the Board of Adjustment. The League of Cities and Towns, 
a substantial majority of those members were effected, impacted, 
negatively by that decision, in that they had a different procedure 
that they felt suited their needs. What we do in this bill is 
allow each entity to overrule by its ordinance procedure, the 
effects of the Scherbel Case on these entities. 
Now being from Salt Lake City, I contacted Salt Lake City and 
found that the bill is drafted in a way that it does not affect 
them. They have not taken a position on it. They do not oppose 
it, because it does not affect whatJbhey are doing, and we tried to 
draft it carefully so that those \>*cities who have procedures that 
work for them, can continue with them just the way they are, if 
they pass an ordinance and go through that process of hearing etc. 
Some of the complaints and objections were to the effect that, 
there were some who felt that everything should go to the Board of 
Adjustments. There was some language in the Supreme Court case, 
with respect to that, on which there were relying. The League has 
reviewed all of that, and the League of Cities and Towns has ^ V-
requested that we pass this legislation as it now^s£<|2d?L*, &*JLA#£ 
amended. And we believe that it protects the 9**x:*^wE&^^ 
currently doing. It is a fairly short and straight forward bill. 
At this point, Mr. Speaker, I think it would be more appropriate 
for me to turn to questions than to say more about the bill. 
BesidesvBrown might vote for it if I don't talk to long. 
Speaker: Representative Waddups, question of the sponsor please. 
improves i±. Let me be . V^ rv 
^e /fn whicHTthey ruledl ' 
r?> 
fyjb Waddups: Wil l you y i e l d . 
fiJl Lewis: You b e t . 
Speaker: Go ahead. jjs 
Waddups: Representative Lewis, an issue that was raised after 
committee was that the language may now allow the local agency to 
appoint the Planning and Zoning Commission as the appellate body to 
their own decision. Do you see that as a possibility? 
Lewis: That suggestion was made to me also, and I discount that. 
It says "another body" .^tf I read it, another means another, and 
it could not do that. And, I don't think there is anyone who would 
even try that because the Supreme Court would definitely strike 
down an appeal of a body to itself. The League of Cities and Towns 
is aware of that issue and none of them have the intention of doing 
something like that. That's goofy. 
Waddups: The legislative body could be the City Council, and they 
could appoint the Planning and Zoning as the appellate body. 
Lewis: No. I think the language says, "another body". 
Waddups: Meaning that the planning is part of the city council. 
Lewis: If you read the language the way it stands as amended, 
it says, "appeals from the decisions of the Planning and Zoning 
Commission*£fslfia11 be heard by the Board of Adjustment unless the 
legislative body of the municipality by ordinance has designated 
another body as the appellate body for those matters." I 
understand your point. It cannot be the city. They can designate 
someone other than the Board of Adjustments. But you cannot appeal 
to yourself, and if they do that it will clearly be struck down, 
and if they have any legal council at all, they won't do 4:hafe. I 
just don't see that as a concern. r"«V^ **** 
Speaker: Representative Wasden, 
Wasden: Thank you Mr. ,Speaker.JWi11«you yreidy"gponoor. 
Lewis: Sure ;7gp ahead*. (^ 
Wasden: I've been contracted by one of the city councilmen out in 
the Sandy area who has indicated that he felt that the Supreme 
Court decision on this case clarified the responsibilities of two 
branches of government— the Legislative and the Judiciary side. 
The Legislative and Administrative side. I need some help on that 
because from his point of view, what this does then, is deny that 
kind of an opportunity within their city. Would you help me with 
that? 
Lewis: You bet. Representative Craig Moody met with this 
gentleman that you're referring to for half an hour this morning, 
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and he apparently was satisfied that the bill was acceptable the 
way it was. He understood the problems and how the ... attempted 
resolution of those problems. I have suggested, and I spent a half 
an hour listening with the gentleman over the weekend, some other 
folks have indicated/ttiaj: ^ ^ey have some problems. The American 
Planners Associationiftaa questions. We think we have resolved all 
of those, pretty much to the satisfaction of those who are looking 
at it. Let me suggest to you that the Constitution of the State 
and our National Constitution have provisions regarding separation 
of powers. Cities, counties, other units of local government do 
not necessarily have the same restrictions. If they had to separate 
into three bodies on everything the way we do, they might be as 
inefficient as we sometimes are. They do not have to do that, 
first of all. And since some of the arguments regarding separation 
of powers do not apply here, there were some points made about the 
need not tojUift^S body appeal to itself, and frankly, I think from 
our discussion here, the intent of the legislature is that the 
Planning and Zoning Commission cannot be designated as the 
appellate body for its own decisions, and I want to make this 
clear, that as a sponsor of the bill that is definitely my 
legislative intent. 
Speaker: To the bill Representative Prante. 
Prante: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Will the Sponsor yield to a 
question? 
Lewis: Sure. 
Prante. I don't need this applied; I'm just verifying it. In 
Cache County we have a new form of county government. In that 
county government we sometimes hear appeals from local zoning 
ordinances. This doesn't change the ability to review those 
appeals, does it? 
Lewis: This is a city zoning only. It does not apply to 
counties. . v ^^f*U^ 
4-c Uc«N clues 
Prante: -^Ok; thank you. 
Speaker: To the bill Representative Gerald Wilson. 
Wilson: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Will the sponsor yield? 
Lewis: Sure, go ahead. 
Wilson: As I understand it, under the present law, one would have 
a right if they are dissatisfied with the zoning issue before the 
planning commission to go before the governing board, whether that 
is the City Council or City Commission. Is that accurate? 
Lewis: I'm advised that it is only on zoning amendments. 
Wilson: So if a person wanted to rezone a parcel of land to a 
better use or more preferred use, at least in his mind, and that 
request were denied, he could now go where? 
Lewis: To the City Council or the governing body. 
Wilson: Ok. Now if this bill passes, and if the city does not 
designate the Board of Adjustments as the appellate body for this, 
could he still go there. 
Lewis: I'm advised that the answer is yes. 
Wilson: And if the answer is yes, it would seem that there are 
places in your bill that do not adequately address that 
alternative, and that would be on page 3. It appears to refer to 
the Board of Adjustment as performing some of these clerical duties 
related to an appeal. Would it not be proper to make changes 
relating to that also? 
Lewis: The application is limited, Representative Wilson, to 
denial of zoning applications, requests for rezonings or denial of 
conditional use permits. 
Wilson: Ok, and I understand that. 
Lewis: It doesn't apply to variances in other matters. 
Wilson: I understand that, but in those areas where there is an 
appeal, if the governing body does not designate the Board of 
Adjustment to be the appellate body, then specifically on line 3 of 
page 3, we still leave in the wording that says, "from whom the 
appeal is taken and with the Board of Adjustment a notice of 
appeal." In other words he still has to file documents with the 
Board of Adjustment who are not involved in the appeal, and then on 
line 5 and 6 he has to transmit documents to that Board of 
Adjustment and they are not involved in the appeal. 
Lewis: Just a second. Representative Wilson, if you will look at 
line 21 on page 2, the notice that you are talking about at the top 
of page 3 applies only to the persons agreed by an officer, 
department, board or bureau of the municipality. I think you're 
suggesting the need for a possible conforming amendment to what 
we've already done, and I'm advised that in context it isn't 
necessary. 
Wilson: I see what you are saying. Is it that section only deals 
with those limited appeals to the Board of Adjustments. Thank you. 
Speaker: Representative Lebaron, did you have something on this 
bill? 
Lebaron: I did. But the question has been answered, so I withdrew. 
Thank you. 
Speaker: Representative Nix. 
Nix: Will the sponsor yield? 
Speaker: Will you yield? 
Lewis: Sure. 
Nix: Representative, did the court decision affect counties? 
Lewis: No. 
Nix: And that is why it is not addressed in this. Can you 
tell me why it didn't affect counties, but did affect cities. 
Lewis: My understanding is that this section, the section of the 
code that the court was interpreting, was the city zoning code, and 
counties were just not before them. It was not an issue that they 
could decide. It was not before them. 
Nix: Could it affect the counties? 
Lewis: Could the Scherbel case affect the counties? 
Nix: In other words, would the same principles apply? 
Lewis: Probably not. 
Nix: Very good. Thank you. 
Speaker: Representative Bush. 
Bush: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Would the Sponsor yield to a 
question. 
Speaker: Representative Lewis, will you yield? 
Lewis: You bet. 
Bush: In the city of Clearfield, where I live, we have a Board 
of Appeals of which I am a member, which is supposed to be a board 
composed of your peers from the city, to which citizens have a 
right to go to appeal decisions and be heard by them, and this 
isn't a very busy committee/^but in the past we have met a couple 
of times, and we have ^cfasjaga^ i-tinwi things and the city council has 
had to abide by that. Will this bill apply to that at all? 
Lewis: The application that I understand this bill would have 
for that, Representative Bush, is that the Scherbel case would 
require that the Board of Adjustment, and not the board of appeals, 
hear those. This bill lets Clearfield decide that it wants to 
continue with the Board of Appeals, that you've just described, and 
that's the reason the League of Cities and Towns has come, because 
some cities have a different procedure that they would like to keep 
and with the Scherbel Decision they are unable to do that. 
Bush: So they can do either way, then. 
Lewis: This gives the option to the city to handle it in the way 
they think is most effective for their city. 
Bush: Thank you. 
Speaker: Further discussion for House Bill 76 as amended? -Being-
t^eertr, I111 return to the sponsor for sum up. 
Lewis: Let me just say in sum up, there are several persons who 
have had a number of questions about this bill, and Representative 
Wasden and others have been contacted. We held the bill to 
purposely meet with them. Representative Moody met this morning. 
We've asked the city attorney from Murray to meet with them, 
representatives of the league, to make sure that everyone had had 
their input. There are a number of questions, and it is a fairly 
important issue for cities to have the option to operate these as 
they have in the past, as would be comfortable for them. I believe 
that we have either satisfied all of the objections, or at least 
made it clear that there was some disagreement on the philosophy of 
this. But I think most folks have gone away reasonably satisfied, 
that we have answered their objections. At this point, I would 
simply say we're providing the option for the cities to operate at 
what suits them best. Some are large; some are small; different 
cities have different needs. This allows them to be addressed in 
the fashion most suited to the local community. I urge your 
support of this bill. 
Speaker: The voting is open on House Bill 76 as amended. I'm 
preparing to close the vote. It appears to the chair that all 
present have voted. Voting is closed on House Bill 76 as amended. 
House Bill 76 as amended having received 63 affirmative votes and 
10 negative votes passes this house and will be referred to the 
Senate for its further action. 
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ADDENDUM I 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-407(2) and 10-9-704(2) (1992). 
10-9-407, Conditional uses. 
(DA zoning ordinance may contain provisions for conditional uses that 
may be allowed, allowed with conditions, or denied in designated zoning dis-
tricts, based on compliance with standards and criteria set forth in the zoning 
ordinance for those uses. 
(2) The board of adjustments has jurisdiction to decide appeals of the ap-
proval or denial of conditional use permits unless the legislative body has 
enacted an ordinance designating another body as the appellate body for those 
appeals. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-407, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
1991, ch. 235, § 23. § 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
10-9-703- Powers and duties. 
(1) The board of adjustment shall hear and decide: 
(a) appeals from zoning decisions applying the zoning ordinance; 
(b) special exceptions to the terms of the zoning ordinance; and 
(c) variances from the terms of the zoning ordinance. 
(2) The board of adjustment may make determinations regarding the exis-
tence, expansion, or modification of nonconforming uses if that authority is 
delegated to them by the legislative body. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-703, enacted by L. tions as (l)(a) through (l)(c), added new Sub-
1991, ch. 235, § 35; 1992, ch. 23, § 16. section (2), and made related stylistic changes. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
ment, effective July 1,1992 designated Subsec- § n o makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
tion (1), redesignated the subsequent subsec-
10-9-704. Appeals-
CD (a) (i) The applicant or any other person or entity adversely affected by 
a decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance may ap-
peal that decision applying the zoning ordinance by alleging that 
there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination 
made by an official in the administration or interpretation of the 
zoning ordinance. 
(ii) The legislative body shall enact an ordinance establishing a 
reasonable time for appeal to the board of decisions administering or 
interpreting a zoning ordinance. 
(b) Any officer, department, board, or bureau of a municipality affected 
by the grant or refusal of a building permit or by any other decisions of 
the administrative officer in the administration or interpretation of the 
zoning ordinance may appeal any decision to the board of adjustment. 
(2) The board of adjustment shall hear and decide appeals from planning 
commission decisions regarding conditional use permits unless the zoning 
ordinance designates another body to hear conditional use permit appeals. 
(3) The person or entity making the appeal has the burden of proving that 
an error has been made. 
(4) (a) Only zoning decisions applying the zoning ordinance may be ap-
pealed to the board of adjustment. 
(b) A person may not appeal, and the board of adjustment may not 
consider, any zoning ordinance amendments. 
(5) Appeals may not be used to waive or modify the terms or requirements 
of the zoning ordinance. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-704, enacted by L. cer" for "zoning administrator" and "adminis-
1991, ch. 235, § 36; 1992, ch. 23, § 17. tration or interpretation'* for "enforcement and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- administration" in Subsection (1Kb); and in-
ment, effective July 1, 1992, added the (i) des-
 serted "zoning" before "ordinance" in Subsec-
ignation in Subsection (l;(a) and deleted "or
 t j o n (4)(a) 
m 1 ! ! ! ^ ! ^ Effective Dates. - Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
made related stylistic changes: added Subsec- * nn— \ ^ ^. «• *•
 T i , ,~XX 
tion (IXaXii); substituted "administrative^ffi- 5 U ° m a k e 8 t h e aCt effeCtlVe 0 n J u l v h 19Q!> 
t »T l t Add. "I 
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